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ABSTRACT Introduction: This paper aims to analyze how the Center of Government (CoG) operates as units responsible for conduct-
ing the presidential agenda in contemporary Brazil. Materials and Methods: The study applied the theoretical approach of CoG as a
governance arrangement and used qualitative and quantitative data to reach its objective. Besides the bibliographic review on the lit-
erature and official documents, the study synthesizes and deepens empirical data and information from a joint research project cover-
ing the period of political stability in Brazil, from 1995 to 2014, when elected presidents ended their terms. Results: The empirical
findings confirm that CoG is a flexible and dynamic phenomenon. It puts a critical perspective on the normative “good governance”
approach that overvalues its technical dimension and neglects its political aspect. Discussion: The inquiry results shed light on the im-
portance of the relation between politics and policy, by demonstrating that CoG’s configuration and functions vary due to multiple
causes, each president’s priority policy agenda is implemented with different strategies and; the prioritized policies follow a unique
coordination logic inside the Brazilian federal government.
Received in June 30, 2020. Approved in November 2, 2020. Accepted in December 23, 2020.
I. Introduction1
T
he Center of Government (CoG) consists of institutions and actors that
provide direct support to the chief of the executive branch in steering
and coordinating the government’s strategic agenda (Cavalcante, 2018).
It is not a new phenomenon in contemporary states, since, for more than a cen-
tury in Anglo-Saxon and Latin American nations, President and Prime Minister
have delegated responsibility to critical units for leading their government pri-
orities (Fawcett & Gay, 2005; Relyea, 2008; Bonvecchi & Scartascini, 2011).
Although with new terminology, the Center of Government has been gaining
prominence among scholars, elected officials, and multilateral organizations in
the context of increasing demands to the public sector. Governments are cur-
rently facing a set of critical policy challenges globally with continuous
economic, political, social, and technological changes. In addition to that, in-
creasing citizen expectations and demands for public services improvements
pressure public officials to innovate in terms of governance arrangements to im-
prove policy implementation and effectiveness.
Despite its importance, there is limited research regarding executive gover-
nance and policy coordination in Brazil. The bulk of the literature about the
CoG comes from multilateral and auditing organizations, is primarily norma-
tive, descriptive, and based on different administrative contexts (Alessandro,
Lafuente & Santiso, 2013a, 2013b, 2014; OECD, 2014; 2016; Brazil, 2014a;
2014b; 2016). We diverge from this approach because it lacks sound, theoreti-
cal, evidence-based grounds on what the CoG is and how it works.
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This paper aims to analyze how the Center of Government works as units re-
sponsible for conducting the presidential agenda in democratic Brazil. To an-
swer these questions, we analyze empirical information about CoG at the
federal level and synthesize a research project’s findings analyzing the 1995 to
2014 period. We have chosen this period, including three different presidents
and five terms, because it is a time of power alternation with no political turmoil
in contemporary Brazil. Therefore, the analyzed period covers the twenty years
after the democratization that elected presidents ended their terms.
It is worth mentioning that Brazil is a case of a complex and dynamic de-
mocracy with political-institutional characteristics, such as coalitional presi-
dentialism, federalism, autonomous control and oversight agencies, and social
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Research context
The Center of Government (CoG) has gained prominence among scholars, elected officials, and multilateral organizations
since the public sector faces a continuously set of critical policy challenges globally in a context of dynamic economic, political,
social, and technological changes. In addition to that, increasing citizen expectations and demands for public services improve-
ments pressure public officials to innovate in terms of governance arrangements to strengthen policy implementation and effec-
tiveness.
Evidence prior to the study
Despite its importance, there is limited research regarding executive governance and policy coordination in Brazil. The bulk
of the literature about the CoG comes from multilateral and auditing organizations, primarily normative, descriptive, and based on
different administrative contexts. This approach generally lacks sound, theoretical, evidence-based grounds on what the CoG is
and how it works. These efforts to emulate best practices aim to pressure the public administration for better performance and a
higher accountability level. Nevertheless, by neglecting the democratic dynamics and the administrative realities, they may con-
strain the capacity to provide a feasible recommendation and tend to be ineffective or risky.
Added value of this study
This study addresses the framework and operational patterns of the CoG’s governance arrangement from 1995 to 2014,
grounded in empirical research knowledge. It analyzes what is, in fact, the Center of Government, how it changes over time, its
fundamental roles, and how CoG performs the formal and informal tasks in the complicated Brazilian political and administrative
systems. The main conclusion is that the Center of Government is a flexible, complex, and dynamic governance arrangement that
continually changes because of the presidential styles, policy goals, and political and economic conjuncture.
Despite its changeable framework, the chief of staff (Casa Civil), Ministry of Planning, and Ministry of Finance were always
part of Brazil’s CoG. These positions tend to be occupied chiefly by professionals with a technical profile and nonparty affiliation,
followed by the president’s party members. Among the typical functions, coordination, planning, and strategic management of the
president’s priority agenda are predominant in CoG activities. Nevertheless, the units’ leadership and engagement vary due to the
level of policy prioritization and the degree of empowerment given to them by the president.
Implications of all the available evidence
The paper puts into critical perspective the “good governance” understanding of the CoG. The findings raise some objections
over reform packages imposed by external agents unaware of the variety of interpretations about the phenomenon and the institu-
tional context in which the executive governance is embedded. Proposals based on best practices may foster and pressure the pub-
lic administration for better performance and higher accountability. However, establishing a rigid framework and functions to the
CoG by law can be innocuous and problematic. It ignores the urgency of the president’s policy priorities and a world full of
changeable social problems and pressures. Besides, the normative approach departs from a positivity embedded in a supposed
consensus and, above all, from assumptions that adopting successful ideas and practices in disparate political and administrative
realities would automatically accomplish the same results.
The CoG is not only a technical body but a political one. To build authority with the capacity to implement the president’s
agenda demands a high level of investment in resources, institutions, learning, and negotiation to coordinate critical stakeholders
and relationships in and outside government. It is a matter of collective action, which always involves understanding the political
dimension in co-creating solutions for the public sector. Therefore, this paper concludes that plastering the Center of Government
can hamper the executive branch’s capacity to cope with wicked problems, i.e., complex, transversal, and multi-causal issues,
such as the current COVID-19 crisis, that calls for State responses that are not simplistic, in democratic societies and a rapidly
changing environment.
participation in policymaking. These characteristics tend to generate centrifugal
effects and fragmentation of the governmental machinery, which poses consid-
erable challenges to the Center of Government.
The paper’s main argument is that the CoG is a flexible governance arrange-
ment. In other words, it is complex, dynamic, and flexible, varying in terms of
configuration, functions, and governance mechanisms to steer the president’s
priority policy agenda. These features change for several reasons, such as presi-
dential styles, policy goals, and political and economic conjuncture. Therefore,
efforts to emulate best practices based on a normative basis would pressure the
public administration for better performance and a higher level of accountabil-
ity. However, neglecting the democratic dynamics and the administrative reali-
ties not only constrains the capacity to provide feasible recommendation, but
also may be ineffective, counter-productive, and even risky.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section (II) discusses the gover-
nance concept and its relation to the CoG, followed by discussing the Center of
Government’s mainstream view (III). Then, the research questions are ad-
dressed through empirical evidence (IV). Lastly, the paper outlines its main
findings and final remarks (V).
II. The Center of Government as a governance arrangement
In recent times, governance began to conquer a prominent place in policy
and public administration literature (Levi-Faur, 2012). Despite the contested
character of the concept, the proliferation of its use can be associated with at
least three central aspects. The first one is related to bad performance and a lack
of accountability on the traditional public administration model. Second, the
side effects of New Public Management (NPM) reforms, such as excessive
fragmentation, which demanded new forms of coordination (Bouckaert, Peters
& Verhoest, 2016). Finally, the process of interdependence and complexifica-
tion of social problems. Therefore, ‘the center struck back’ is part of the third
generation of administrative reforms, favoring centralized, integrated solutions,
but with new mechanisms and instruments of coordination (Bouckaert, Peters,
and Verhoest, 2016).
It is worth mentioning the efforts that have been made by multilateral orga-
nizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), to deepen
knowledge about the CoG and to recommend actions on this topic (Alessandro,
Lafuente & Santiso, 2013a, 2013b, 2014, OECD, 2014, 2016). These efforts de-
rive from the mainstream agenda of ‘good governance’ created by the World
Bank (Santiso, 2001). However, such recommendations have received a set of
criticisms for being naive and unrealistic. According to Pollitt and Hupe (2011),
this is because they are considered rhetoric of fashion, generate vague and inac-
curate interpretations, have a normative appeal, and suggest a consensus.
On a different approach, governance can be understood as a set of relational
dynamics involving multiple actors (from the state and society) interconnected
by formal and informal institutions to produce state policy capacities (Le Galès,
2011; Capano, Howlett & Ramesh, 2015). In this vein, governance involves ac-
tors’ interactions, rules, resources, mechanisms, and instruments organized in
arrangements for steering policies and holding the government accountable.
These governance arrangements may lead to efficiency and legitimacy in the
political system, increasing the state capacity (Peters & Pierre, 2010). It implies
governance as an analytical perspective that sheds light on the relational dy-
namics among actors in state actions.
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Therefore, governance can be operationalized by institutional arrangements
that organize and stabilize the relations between the different actors involved in
policy processes (Gomide & Pires, 2014; Pires & Gomide, 2016). These ar-
rangements are interpreted as diversified, depending on the actors’ characteris-
tics, institutional contexts, and historical legacies. Put differently, governance
arrangements are path-dependent and vary according to political dynamics,
stakeholders’ strategies, and administrative resources involved.
Compared to prescriptive-formal perspectives, the analytical approach of
governance as institutional arrangements has advantages for considering the in-
determinate nature of the policy processes. Consequently, any policy’s success
and effectiveness can be due to its governance arrangement that can foster or
harm the level of commitment, coordination, and cooperation needed. The same
approach is appropriate to the Center of Government’s analysis because it can
be studied as a governance arrangement, in which coordination of collective ac-
tion is the primary goal since it involves different public organizations and pol-
icy stakeholders (Filgueiras, 2019). Hence, CoG is not a trivial and easily
replicable arrangement based on standard and normative recommendations.
III. The official view of the Brazilian CoG
Before addressing the research questions, we discuss in the present section
how the mainstream view of the Center of Government has been currently
adapted and adopted to the Brazilian federal administration.
In Latin America, existing studies show that CoGs differ in their ability to
perform their essential functions. However, they are considered with low capac-
ity by multilateral organizations, which leads to a series of recommendations to
CoG improvements in the region (Alessandro, Lafuente, & Santiso, 2013a,
2013b, 2014; OECD, 2014, 2016). We claim these pieces of advice could gain
soundness by drawing from evidence-based information provided by empirical
research.
Influenced by publications from multilateral organizations, the Brazilian
Superior Court of Account (Tribunal de Contas da Uniao - TCU) suggested le-
gal instruments to institutionalize the CoG in the country. It resulted in an en-
acted presidential decree and a legislative bill for “fostering good governance in
the GoG, providing support and inducing its strengthening performance to a co-
herent implementation of the Executive’s strategy" (Brazil, 2016: 11-12). De-
spite these goals’ merits, we consider this initiative highly normative and with
theoretical and empirical flaws that culminate in conceptual confusion about the
Center of Government and its functions. The TCU’s Guidelines for Assessing
CoG’s Governance indicates four assumptions for its performance:
i. Strategy: the result-oriented budgeting process should be linked
with comprehensive governmental strategic planning;
ii. Coordination: to ensure the cooperation of ministries and agencies
towards consistent policymaking, efficient, timely, and sustainable in
terms of budget;
iii. Supervision: government plan must be continuously monitored
by measuring performance indicators and stakeholders’ results;
iv. Transparency: voluntary and transparent communication of activ-
ities and outcomes are useful to encourage performance improvement
and accountability.
The TCU Guidelines also recommended a rigid and formal structure com-
posed of all the presidency’s units, Ministries of Planning and Economy, and
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the Council for Economic and Social Development. This view had shaped the
legislative bill and the presidential decree. As one can see, the TCU’s Guide-
lines presents a normative view of the CoG associated with the concept of ‘good
governance’:
“In this context, the strengthening of the CoG towards good governance will be
directly linked to the CoG’s ability to perform its functions and increase the
State’s delivery capability. An efficient and effective CoG steers, monitors, and
evaluates the State’s deliveries. Suppose the GoG does not adequately fulfill its
functions. In that case, the negative effects can lead to incoherence and/or antag-
onism between public policies, lack of strategic vision, poor formulation of ob-
jectives and policy targets, and inadequate follow-up and monitoring of the
agenda’ formulation (Brazil, 2016, 29-30).”
It is interesting to note that the Ministry of Planning and the Council have
been extinct since 2019. The presidential administrative structure has also un-
dergone several changes, but most important is that there is no evidence that the
changes have affected the CoG’s functions and performance.
IV. Empirical-based knowledge on the Brazilian CoG
This section empirically analyzes the Brazilian Center of Government to un-
derstand how it is structured and how it functions. To do so, we employ empiri-
cal data from previous research on CoG (Cavalcante & Gomide, 2018). The
findings corroborate our hypothesis that the CoG is a dynamic and complex
governance arrangement.
IV.1 What is the Center of Government?
The Center of Government is frequently classified in two ways: the narrow
and the extended perspectives (Alessandro, Lafuente & Santiso, 2013a). The
first one, a.k.a. structural, refers to those units that are a formal part of the presi-
dential structure or of the prime minister’s office. In contrast, the second one,
also known as the functional definition, includes units outside the presidential
structure that perform typical Center of Government’s functions such as policy
coordination and monitoring (Alessandro, Lafuente, & Santiso, 2013a; 2014;
OECD, 2014).
However, how has the Brazilian CoG evolved during the 1995-2014 period?
The number of units, especially ministries, in the studied period has increased.
This increase is due to the growing complexity of governmental actions and the
relevance of the CoG. Based on the structural definition, we collected informa-
tion about the units that were formally established inside the presidency. Ta-
ble 1 displays the CoG’s compositional changes in Brazil, by presidential term.
Observing Table 1, one will notice that during President Cardoso’s first ad-
ministration the CoG consisted of eleven units: eight ministries and three coun-
cils. In Cardoso’s second term, the coordinational dimension was strengthened
to eight ministries versus five in the previous term, and introduced a specific
secretariat for policy delivery - urban development. However, the main changes
in the Center of Government occurred after the presidential turnover, i.e., dur-
ing the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) administrations of Lula
Da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014).
PT is a typical left-wing party that had to rule the country with a broad party
coalition. This fact has brought several changes in the configuration of the Cen-
ter of Government. The first and most notorious was the increase of the number
of ministries, and consequently, the number of units inside the CoG (if
Cardoso’s first term had eleven units, the average number of PT’s administra-
How does the governance of the executive branch operate in democratic Brazil? 5/14
tion were twenty-three). The same occurred regarding the ministerial cabinet
composition since the number of ministers raised from 29 (Cardoso administra-
tion) to thirty-seven in Lula’s terms to thirty-nine during Rousseff’s administra-
tion.
A possible explanation for this increase relies on the Brazilian Executive co-
alition’s features. While five parties composed Cardoso’s administration with a
high ideological convergence of center-right, PT’s supporting coalition was
quantitatively higher (around ten parties) and quite heterogeneous in ideologi-
cal terms. Thus, the number of units in the cabinet increased as well as the coor-
dination units (ministries and councils) in CoG, which indicates a strategy of PT
administrations to strengthen its control and to build governability in a broader
and ideologically diverse coalition. Figure 1 displays the ideological index dis-
tance between the most extreme parties in the five administrations’ coalitions
analyzed. The indexes, measured by the Brazilian Legislative Survey, vary
from 0 to 10; however, they have ranged from 1.1 to 8.89 in the last decades
(Zucco, 2014).
In the same direction, Cavalcante and Batista (2018) drew from the analysis
of the daily presidential schedule to demonstrate how the number of ministries
increased in the CoG between 1995-2014. This was due to the growing com-
plexity of governmental actions and the relevance of the Center of Govern-
ment’s typical functions, especially politics and policy coordination. The
authors’ innovative approach, based on how frequently ministries interacted
with the president, proves that de jure or formal CoG is quite different from the
CoG de facto, i.e. one that effectively participates in the president’s routine
agenda.
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Cardoso I 8 3 0 8 29 3
Cardoso II 8 1 1 10 27 3
Lula da Silva I 9 1 4 14 35 8
Lula da Silva II 9 1 5 15 37 8
Rousseff 9 1 6 16 39 9
Source: Brazilian Presidency (www.planalto.gov.br).
* Besides the councils, it also includes units without minister’s status (Chief of Staff and Special Advisory) in the Presidency
Structure.
Source: Adapted from Zucco (2014).
Figure 1 - The Presidential Coalitions’ Ideology Distance
With a focus on the “Brazil without Poverty” Program (BWP) case, Mello
(2019) provides an additional perspective of the CoG. She argues that the Min-
istry of Social Development (MDS), responsible for this priority policy under
Rousseff’s administration (2011-2014), is an example of a Center of the Gov-
ernment unit outside the presidential structure. Although MDS formally was not
part of the CoG, it has carried out typical CoG’s activities, such as coordination,
strategic management, performance monitoring, and accountability. The case
demonstrates the dynamic and temporary nature of this governance arrange-
ment, which may vary according to the presidential style and empowerment, le-
gitimacy, and prioritization level embedded in the program management. When
the program ended, the MDS lost the status of the Center of Government.
Furthermore, Pompeu and Lassance (2018) also find differences in functio-
nalities inside the CoG by studying autobiographical information from Car-
doso’s first year (1995). The authors claim three different hubs in the Center of
Government: Managerial, Economic, and Political. The first hub consists of the
advisory team composed of government staff in charge of administrative and
day-to-day policy operations. The economic CoG is composed of three minis-
tries: economy, planning, and central bank. Lastly, the political hub has the
president himself, the main protagonist, and the vice president and coalition
party leaders in negotiation with Congress and conflict resolution.
Ministers’ profiles differences in the president’s strategies in defining
CoG’s command chain compared, when the chief of Executive gives autonomy
to his/her cabinet to build a unified and centralized bureaucratic system, the sit-
uation in which to secure the governability president tends for units. In this case,
ministries are primarily nonpartisan or from the president party and seldom
from the coalition
IV.2 How the Center of Government operates
In this subsection, we explore the CoG in terms of its routine operations to
demonstrate the complexity of its functions in a context of dynamic governance
arrangement that employs a variety of mechanisms and instruments to coordi-
nate the president’s strategic agenda.
To begin with, what is a strategic agenda and how is it defined? The norma-
tive approach of CoG supports that an administration and its leaders have a stra-
tegic plan for the government and should implement it in convergence with the
budgeting process (Brazil, 2016, p. 17-18). Nevertheless, the capacity to imple-
ment it effectively faces two crucial challenges. First, government strategy is
not static, visible, and exclusive (Capano, Howlett, & Ramesh, 2015). Even
though documents might indicate the priority policy goals (such as the presi-
dent’s electoral agenda and the Pluri-annual Plan - PPA), they are not manda-
tory. De Toni (2018) addresses these issues by investigating how the president
builds policy priorities by testing three hypotheses. First, the CoG’s priorities
stem from the electoral platform. Second, the mandatory PPA’s formulation in
each term’s first year influences the president’s strategic agenda formation. Fi-
nally, studies of perspective, long-term, and foresight scenarios inspire agenda
formation. The findings confirm the first hypothesis of electoral programs’ sub-
stantive influence and the coalition leading party, although not linearly since the
process also involves economic constraints and political bargaining. As for the
PPA, De Toni identifies a dissonance between the institutional agenda pre-
sented in these plans and its practical priorities. Likewise, prospective studies
do not affect the strategic agenda. In short, the presidential agenda is a dynamic
equation grounded in a continuous decision-making process that considers the
political contest in a democratic environment and the scenarios of uncertainties
and other social and economic constraints.
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Regarding the mechanisms and instruments used by the CoG to steer the
strategic agenda, Cavalcante, Gomide, and Barbosa (2019) compared Da
Silva’s and Rousseff’s administration priority policies, examining how the Cen-
ter of Government coordinated them. The findings show that the priority poli-
cies were coordinated mainly by informal and ad hoc instruments due to the
government’s dynamism and urgency. The authors emphasize that hierarchical
coordination mechanisms, often placed by the literature as the most important in
the task-alignment strategies, were conjugated with network type mechanisms,
given the constant search for trust, negotiation, and collaboration inside the
government. Regarding the levels of coordination achieved (Metcalfe, 1994),
the pieces of evidence suggest that the Chief of Staff (Casa Civil) and the minis-
ters empowered by the president continuously arbitrate conflicts in the cabinet
(negative coordination). However, the definition of priorities and national strat-
egy predominantly stem from the presidents’ office.
Lameirão (2018) analyzed the role of the Chief of Staff in the CoG. She
found that the unit had diverse configurations during the period analyzed and
assumed diverse functions. Her study also demonstrates that the Chief of Staff
has a secondary role as author of the executive law proposal (less than 5%).
However, it permanently examines all bills’ content, conducts the final deci-
sion-making process, and is the primary locus of government coordination.
The coordination of the legislative agenda is also a crucial subject to the
Center of Government. For this reason, Batista (2018) explores the Executive’s
governance strategies from an interactional approach, i.e., analyzing the degree
of interaction between the president and the different actors in the executive
branch. The approach demonstrates that the higher the CoG units’ participation,
the greater the ability to translate agenda priorities into the president’s legisla-
tive propositions. An analysis of President Cardoso’s (1995-2002) and Rous-
seff’s (2011-2014) meeting schedule highlights different management styles.
The former preferred a more collective interaction with his ministers, while the
latter used direct meetings with line ministers, which suggests that Cardoso
used a collegiate style and Rousseff used closer to a hierarchical one (Johnson,
1974).
Similarly, Lopez, Silva, and Borges (2018) analyzed the presidency’s role -
especially the chief of staff - in the delegation and control of policies to the co-
alition partners. Their findings show that agenda setting is dual: one with the
president’s priority interest and the other with the line ministries’ proposals. In
both cases, the formulation process begins in line ministries, with CoG perform-
ing a reactive or ex-post control. The chief of staff operates as a gatekeeper for
the president, to which extent it decentralizes the bills’ formulation, mediates
conflicts, and refines the proposal before sending them to Congress.
The policy coordination with other levels of government is also an essential
task in Brazilian federalism. To address this subject, Lotta and Freitas (2018)
examined the coordination of federal policy initiatives during the period 2003-
2014. The authors claim that the federal government has undertaken deliberate
actions to strengthen the federative coordination to produce cooperation. The
coordination efforts (mechanisms and instruments) aimed to promote long-term
cooperation, transparency, and inter-sectoral coherence. The main protagonist
of these actions was the Head for Federative Affairs (Subchefia de Assuntos
Federativos - SAF), situated in the presidency. They demonstrate how effective
SAF was in building key multilevel governance projects during which the presi-
dent empowered the unit.
The relationship between State and society is also a salient task of CoG. It
involves mechanisms of coordination, accountability, and communication. In
this sense, Karam, Avelino, and Fonseca (2018) prove that General Secretariat
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(Secretaria Geral) and the Council for Economic and Social Development
(CESD), both of which reside in the presidency, led a prominent role in social
participation policy from 2003 to 2014. A social participation policy was for-
mulated and implemented through a long process of debates, conflicts, and ne-
gotiations involving ideas, interests, and strategies of diverse social actors
mediated by the CoG. The authors highlighted differences between the rules of
consolidation and divergence in the interaction with other civil society actors. In
sum, the main finding was how complex, mutable and diverse the Center of
Government is since it was continuously busy with dissonances and disagree-
ments from inside and outside the executive branch, reinforcing the dynamic
perspective of governance (Capano, Howlett & Ramesh, 2015). If the priority
agenda is much more complicated than the normative view tends to report, the
same should be expected regarding managing the Center of Government’s pres-
idential priorities. In this regard, Magalhaes and Couto (2018) analyzed the
mechanisms and instruments designed to implement two major infrastructure
investment programs: Brazil in Action (Brasil em Acao) and the Growth Accel-
eration Program (Programa de Aceleracao do Crescimento - PAC), during the
Cardoso and Da Silva administrations, respectively. They part from the
assumption that, although each president’s CoGs had the same embedded func-
tion, they played their roles differently. The empirical findings are quite impres-
sive. First, in either case, the program management tends to be more fluid and
flexible than static and unique. Different leadership styles have also led to dif-
ferent approaches to priorities management.
Moreover, new tools and processes were created based on ideas derived
from the professional and political experiences and learning of the CoG’s mem-
bers. The Brazil in Action program (PAC) aimed to speed up the hierarchical re-
lations between the line ministries and the coordination units through process
improvement and staff training. In contrast, PAC built more horizontal and col-
lective strategies to identify and overcome bottlenecks in the project selection
and implementation. In sum, the authors conclude that similar political and ad-
ministrative contexts were not barriers to how the Center of Government oper-
ates in different governance arrangements.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper advances the understanding of how the Executive branch func-
tions in Brazil. We addressed the framework and operational patterns of the
CoG’s governance arrangement, discussing, grounded in empirical evidence
and research knowledge. The focuses direct to what are, in fact, the Center of
Government, how it changes over time, what are its fundamental roles and,
above all, how the Center of Government performs the formal and informal
tasks in the complicated Brazilian political and administrative systems.
Our main argument is that the CoG is a flexible, complex, and dynamic gov-
ernance arrangement that continually changes because of the presidential styles,
policy goals, and political and economic conjuncture. In short, we can synthe-
size these research findings:
• The composition of the CoG is not static and varied during each
analyzed period. It changes mainly due to the policy agenda priori-
tized by the presidents. However, the chief of staff, Ministry of
Planning, and Ministry of Finance were always part of the CoG.
• The Center of Government units tend to be governed by profes-
sionals with a technical profile and nonparty affiliation, followed
by the president’s party members.
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• Among the typical functions, coordination, planning, and strategic
management of the president’s priority agenda are predominant in
CoG activities. Nevertheless, the units’ leadership and engage-
ment vary due to the level of policy prioritization and the degree of
empowerment given to them by the president;
• The role of informal coordination instruments is as important as
the formal ones, and the employment of governance mechanisms
(hierarchy, market, and networks) changes according to the policy
issue and the president’s management style;
• The strategic agendas are usually defined by the president, incor-
porating not only the guidelines of the electoral platform but,
above all, always adjusting to the bargaining game of the coali-
tion’s political base and economic and social constraints;
• The CoG’s relationships with civil society and other government
levels (states and municipalities) vary according to the presiden-
tial style and the characteristics of the policies involved.
The research put into critical perspective the “good governance” under-
standing of the Center of Government, considering it naïve and unrealistic once
it overvalues the object’s normative dimension and neglects its political feature
in a democratic regime.
The findings raise some objections over reform packages imposed by exter-
nal agents unaware of the variety of interpretations about the phenomenon and
the institutional context in which the executive governance is embedded. Pro-
posals based on best practices may foster and pressure the public administration
for better performance and higher accountability; however, establishing a COG
in law or decree can be innocuous, counter-productive, and risky as it ignores
the urgency of the president’s policy priorities and a world full of changeable
social problems and pressures. Besides, the normative approach departs from a
positivity embedded in a supposed consensus and, above all, from assumptions
that adopting successful ideas and practices in disparate political and adminis-
trative realities would automatically accomplish the same results.
The ‘governance mechanisms’ recommended by the TCU’s Guidelines for
the Brazilian federal administration are already included in the CoG’s usual
functions, but they cannot be regulated since its governance arrangement is re-
lational and contextual. It includes multiple actors interconnected by formal and
informal institutions and employs various mechanisms and instruments to coor-
dinate their actions. Therefore, the CoG is not only a technical object but also a
political one. To build authority with the capacity to implement the president’s
agenda demands a high level of investment in resources, institutions, learning,
and negotiation to coordinate in and outside government players. It is a matter
of collective action, which always involves understanding the political dimen-
sion for solutions co-creation for the public sector. Another aspect that stands
out in this discussion involves the vastly disproportionate emphasis given to the
supposed need to increase public administration’s institutional control to the
detriment of other dimensions. The control must be better balanced with other
crucial affairs, such as partnership and cooperation, bureaucratic capacity
building, and innovation culture.
To sum up, this paper concludes that plastering the Center of Government
can hamper the executive branch’s capacity to cope with wicked problems, i.e.,
complex, transversal, and multi-causal issues, such as climate changing, immi-
gration and the current COVID-19 crisis, which calls for State responses that
are not simplistic, in democratic societies and a rapidly changing world.
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The next step of the future research agenda points to the investigation of
CoG as an independent variable or explanation for the policy governance out-
puts and outcomes. In other words, how the framework of a given Center of
Government impacts (positively or negatively) a particular policy’s perfor-
mance in the executive branch. The analyses could focus on comparisons at
subnational levels and between countries in the same region, such as Latin
America. The studies that acknowledge the diversity of institutional factors that
determine the executive governance framework tend to be more realistic and
appropriated to provide insights into a qualified debate about how coordination
and management of presidents’ priority agenda work and subsidize recommen-
dations for their performance improvement.
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Como funciona a governança do poder executivo no Brasil democrático? Uma análise do Centro de
Governo
RESUMO Introdução: O objetivo deste artigo é analisar como o Centro de Governo (CdG) atua como unidade responsável pela
condução da agenda presidencial no Brasil contemporâneo. Materiais e Métodos: O estudo aplicou a abordagem teórica do CdG
como um arranjo de governança e utilizou dados qualitativos e quantitativos para atingir seu objetivo. Além da revisão bibliográfica
sobre a literatura e documentos oficiais, o estudo sintetiza e aprofunda dados empíricos e informações de um projeto de pesquisa
conjunto abrangendo o período de estabilidade política no Brasil, de 1995 a 2014, quando os presidentes eleitos finalizaram seus
mandatos. Resultados: Os achados empíricos confirmam que CdG é fenômeno dinâmico e flexível. Isso coloca em perspectiva crítica
a abordagem normativa da “boa governança” que supervaloriza sua dimensão técnica e negligência seu aspecto político. Discussão:
Os resultados da pesquisa lançam luz sobre a importância da relação entre política e políticas públicas, ao demonstrar que a
configuração e as funções do Centro de Governo variam devido a múltiplas causas, cada agenda de política pública do presidente é
implementada de forma diferente e as políticas priorizadas seguem uma lógica de coordenação única dentro do governo federal
brasileiro.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License which permits
unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited.
A produção desse manuscrito foi viabilizada através do patrocínio fornecido pelo Centro Universitário Internacional Uninter à Revista de
Sociologia e Política.
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Contexto de pesquisa
O Centro de Governo (CdG) tem ganhado destaque entre acadêmicos, dirigentes públicos e organizações multilaterais,
considerando que o setor público vem enfrentando um conjunto de desafios críticos de políticas públicas em um contexto de
dinâmicas mudanças econômicas, políticas, sociais e tecnológicas em todo o mundo. Além disso, as expectativas e demandas
crescentes dos cidadãos por melhorias nos serviços públicos pressionam os políticos a inovar em termos de arranjos de
governança para fortalecer a implementação e a eficácia das políticas.
Evidências antes do estudo
Apesar de sua importância, há poucas pesquisas sobre a governança do Poder Executivo e coordenação de políticas públicas
no Brasil. A maior parte da literatura sobre o CdG vem de organizações multilaterais e de área de controle, publicações
predominantemente normativas e fundamentados em diferentes contextos político-administrativos. Essa abordagem geralmente
carece de base teórica sólida e evidências empíricas válidas sobre o que é o CdG e como ele funciona. Esses esforços visam emular
boas práticas para pressionar a administração pública por um melhor desempenho e maior nível de accountability. No entanto, ao
negligenciar a dinâmica democrática e as realidades administrativas específicas, eles podem limitar a capacidade de fornecer uma
recomendação viável e, assim, tendem a ser ineficazes ou até arriscados.
Valor agregado deste estudo
O presente estudo analisa a estrutura e os padrões de funcionamento do arranjo de governança do CdG brasileiro, de 1995 a
2014, com base no conhecimento de pesquisa empírica e científica. Aborda o que é, de fato, o Centro de Governo, como se
modifica ao longo do tempo, seus papéis fundamentais e como o CdG desempenha as tarefas formais e informais no complicado
sistema político e administrativo do Brasil. A principal conclusão é que o Centro de Governo é um arranjo de governança flexível,
complexo e dinâmico que muda continuamente devido aos estilos presidenciais, objetivos das políticas públicas e conjunturas
política e econômica.
Apesar de sua estrutura mutável, a Casa Civil e os Ministérios do Planejamento e da Fazenda sempre fizeram parte do CdG
brasileiro. Esses cargos tendem a ser ocupados principalmente por profissionais de perfil mais técnico e não partidário, seguidos
dos correligionários do presidente. Dentre as funções típicas, a coordenação, o planejamento e a gestão estratégica da agenda de
prioridades do presidente são predominantes nas atividades do Centro de Governo. No entanto, a liderança e o engajamento das
unidades integrantes do CdG variam em função do grau de priorização investido na agenda estratégica e de autonomia dado a elas
pelo presidente.
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Implicações das evidências disponíveis
O artigo coloca em perspectiva crítica a abordagem de “boa governança” do Centro de Governo. Os achados levantam
objeções em relação aos pacotes de reformas impostos por agentes externos que desconhecem a variedade de interpretações sobre
esse fenômeno e o contexto institucional no qual a governança do Poder Executivo está inserida. Propostas baseadas em boas
práticas servem para estimular e pressionar a administração pública por um melhor desempenho e mais accountability, no entanto,
estabelecer em lei a rigidez na estrutura e nas funções do CdG pode ser inócuo e problemático. Porque ignora a urgência das
prioridades de políticas públicas do presidente e um mundo repleto de problemas e pressões sociais em constante mudança. Além
disso, a abordagem normativa parte de uma positividade embutida em um suposto consenso e, sobretudo, de pressupostos de que a
adoção de ideias e práticas bem-sucedidas em realidades políticas e administrativas díspares alcançaria automaticamente os
mesmos resultados.
Em síntese, o CdG não é apenas um órgão técnico, mas, sobretudo, político. Construir autoridade com capacidade para
implementar a agenda presidencial exige um alto nível de investimento em recursos, instituições, aprendizado e negociação para
coordenar atores-chave envolvidos e relacionamentos dentro e fora do governo. Trata-se de uma questão de ação coletiva, que
sempre envolve a compreensão da dimensão política na co-criação de soluções para o setor público. Portanto, este artigo conclui
que engessar o Centro de Governo pode prejudicar a capacidade do Executivo de lidar com os chamados wicked problems, ou seja,
problemas complexos, transversais e multicausais, como a atual crise do COVID-19, que exigem respostas do Estado nada
simplórias em sociedades democráticas e em um ambiente de rápidas mudanças.
